| Re: EAP Id management | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Alan DeKok (aland |
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| Date: Wed, 27 May 2009 03:29:05 -0700 (PDT) | |
Alper Yegin wrote: > According to RFC 3748: > > Since the Identifier space is unique to each session, > authenticators are not restricted to only 256 simultaneous > authentication conversations. Similarly, with re-authentication, > an EAP conversation might continue over a long period of time, and > is not limited to only 256 roundtrips. I think that statement isn't overly clear. > This statement implies that the Identifier management extends beyond > EAP-Success/Failure into subsequent EAP re-authentications. That would seem to be a valid interpretation of that sentence. However, all AAA servers I'm aware of treat EAP sessions as finishing at EAP-Success/Fail. That is, the *EAP* layer management treats re-authentication the same as authentication. The EAP Id's are tracked, but once an EAP-Success/Fail is sent back, all information about "current" Id's is discarded. > If that’s > true, Id of the first EAP packet after an EAP-Success (e.g., initiation > of EAP re-auth) has to be different than the Id used with the > EAP-Success. [Problem: EAP re-auth may take place with another > authenticator in the case of mobility, and that authenticator would not > know the last Id used with the previous authenticator.] Yes. > But on the other hand, this text is not normative, and EAP State Machine > RFC 4137 already ignores that by resetting currentId to "NONE" at the > beginning of EAP authentication. Yes. > So, which one is the right way, and which one did the implementations > follow? The implementations I'm aware of all followed the method of RFC 4137: Discard all information about Id's on Success/Fail. Alan DeKok.
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EAP Id management Alper Yegin, May 27 2009
- Re: EAP Id management Alan DeKok, May 27 2009
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