Re: [HOKEY] ERX fraud issue
From: Bernard_Aboba (Bernard_Abobahotmail.com)
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 16:03:20 -0700 (PDT)
 A proxy inserting a DSRK for the purposes of faking authentication
would presumably do so without the cooperation of the visited network.
The proxy would then have to filter the accounting traffic from the
visited network.

[BA] Ah... so you are saying that the forgery can be detected by looking for overlap in the time sequence of user activity? This seems like a fairly intensive check, though.

 This is where a 3 party *reconciliation* protocol would be beneficial.
If the visited network, proxies, and home network all share their
accounting data, fraud is easier to detect.

[BA] I was looking for something simpler, such as a mechanism that would enable checking of a ERX auth exchange with the home server against subsequent accounting records sent by the local ERX server. For example, if the peer were to use ERX to tell the home server what local domain it is in, then the home server could ensure that it only accepts accounting records from that domain, and no other ones.

[BA] It would certainly help for the subsequent ERX accounting records to
be tied to the original EAP session (e.g. via use of the same
Multi-Session-Id).

Not many systems implement Multi-Session-Id. It may be simpler just to require the accounting records for the visited network to be consistent. i.e. when a user moves to a new NAS, the records could be sent through the visited network AAA server, which could do the necessary data massaging to create a canonical accounting stream.

[BA] That would be fine too, as long as the home server knows what
visited network the accounting data is supposed to come from.


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