Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK
From: Bernard_Aboba (Bernard_Abobahotmail.com)
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 04:40:54 -0800 (PST)
I would agree that the label does not guarantee key freshness, as a nonce would.

But doesn't it provide the ability to derive crypto-graphically separate keys from the MSK
or portions of it?


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From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins [at] lounge.org>
Sent: Monday, November 19, 2007 11:07 PM
To: <Bernard_Aboba [at] hotmail.com>
Cc: "'eap-WG'" <eap [at] frascone.com>
Subject: Re: [eap] Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK


Lower layers derive session keys from an MSK via a secure association protocol (like 802.11i's "4 way handshake"). RFC4962 says,

   "The AAA protocol and EAP method MUST ensure that the keying material
    supplied as an input to session key derivation is fresh, and the
    secure association protocol MUST generate a separate session key
    for each session, even if the keying material provided by EAP is
    cached....
   "Session keys MUST NOT be dependent on one another.  Multiple
    session keys may be derived from a higher-level shared secret
    as long as a one-time value, usually called a nonce, is used to
    ensure that each session key is fresh.  The mechanism used to
    generate session keys MUST ensure that the disclosure of one
    session key does not aid the attacker in discovering any other
    session keys."

 So it seems to me that the label is not the thing that ensures
uniqueness as that would tend to be constant among multiple session
keys. It is the nonce that ensures uniqueness.

 If the label is not a nonce-- a number only used once-- then it's
not providing the uniqueness you describe. If it is a nonce then there
is already text to describe this requirement in RFC4962 and there is
no issue.

 Dan.

On Fri, November 16, 2007 6:47 am, Bernard_Aboba [at] hotmail.com wrote:
To date, EAP lower layers utilizing the MSK have often utilized a label
within the PRF used for deriving other keys in order to ensure
uniqueness of key branches.  This includes 802.11i, 802.11r, and now
802.1af.

However, this "unwritten rule" has not been included the EKMF document.
This seems like a fairly important omission.
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