| Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Bernard_Aboba (Bernard_Aboba |
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| Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2007 04:40:54 -0800 (PST) | |
I would agree that the label does not guarantee key freshness, as a nonce
would.
But doesn't it provide the ability to derive crypto-graphically separate keys from the MSK
or portions of it?
But doesn't it provide the ability to derive crypto-graphically separate keys from the MSK
or portions of it?
-------------------------------------------------- From: "Dan Harkins" <dharkins [at] lounge.org> Sent: Monday, November 19, 2007 11:07 PM To: <Bernard_Aboba [at] hotmail.com> Cc: "'eap-WG'" <eap [at] frascone.com> Subject: Re: [eap] Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK
Lower layers derive session keys from an MSK via a secure association protocol (like 802.11i's "4 way handshake"). RFC4962 says,
"The AAA protocol and EAP method MUST ensure that the keying material supplied as an input to session key derivation is fresh, and the secure association protocol MUST generate a separate session key for each session, even if the keying material provided by EAP is cached.... "Session keys MUST NOT be dependent on one another. Multiple session keys may be derived from a higher-level shared secret as long as a one-time value, usually called a nonce, is used to ensure that each session key is fresh. The mechanism used to generate session keys MUST ensure that the disclosure of one session key does not aid the attacker in discovering any other session keys."
So it seems to me that the label is not the thing that ensures uniqueness as that would tend to be constant among multiple session keys. It is the nonce that ensures uniqueness.
If the label is not a nonce-- a number only used once-- then it's not providing the uniqueness you describe. If it is a nonce then there is already text to describe this requirement in RFC4962 and there is no issue.
Dan.
On Fri, November 16, 2007 6:47 am, Bernard_Aboba [at] hotmail.com wrote:To date, EAP lower layers utilizing the MSK have often utilized a label within the PRF used for deriving other keys in order to ensure uniqueness of key branches. This includes 802.11i, 802.11r, and now 802.1af.
However, this "unwritten rule" has not been included the EKMF document. This seems like a fairly important omission. _________________________________________________________________ To unsubscribe or modify your subscription options, please visit: http://lists.frascone.com/mailman/listinfo/eap
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Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Bernard_Aboba, November 16 2007
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Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Joseph Salowey (jsalowey), November 19 2007
- Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Bernard_Aboba, November 20 2007
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Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Dan Harkins, November 19 2007
- Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Bernard_Aboba, November 20 2007
- Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Narayanan, Vidya, November 20 2007
- Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Bernard_Aboba, November 20 2007
- Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Lakshminath Dondeti, November 22 2007
- Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Bernard_Aboba, November 22 2007
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Re: Issue: Use of a label in derivation of keys from the MSK Joseph Salowey (jsalowey), November 19 2007
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