eap Mailing List: Re: hopefully final changes for draft-ietf-eap-keying

[Glen Zorn (glenzorn]

[gwz] ... [/gwz]

In Section 5.3, change:

OLD:
Authentication mechanisms MUST maintain the confidentiality of any
secret values used in the authentication process.
NEW:
Each party in the AAA key management protocol MUST be
authenticated to the other parties with whom they communicate.

[gwz] 
This wording would seem to preclude the use of any real-life AAA
infrastructure in the "AAA key management protocol" since in a chain of
RADIUS proxies (or Diameter agents) authentication is pairwise, not
end-to-end.
[/gwz]

Authentication mechanisms MUST maintain the confidentiality of
any secret values used in the authentication process.

In Section 5.5, change:

OLD:
Once the AAA key management
protocol exchanges are complete, all of these parties should hold
a common view of the authorizations associated the other parties.
NEW:
Once the AAA key management
protocol exchanges are complete, all of these parties should
hold a common view of the authorizations associated with the
other parties.

[gwz] No change? [/gwz]

and also

OLD:
As described in [RFC3748]
Section 7.15, channel binding enables the peer to verify that the
authenticator claim of identity is both consistent and correct.
NEW:
As described in [RFC3748]
in Section 7.15, channel binding is required to enable the
peer to verify that the authenticator claim of identity is both
consistent and correct.


[gwz] 
Except, of course, in cases of collusion between members of the
authentication chain.  BTW (I'll ask this question just one more time on the
off-chance that I'll get a reasonable answer), what, exactly does this buy
us (assuming no collusion)?  To use a very simple example from real life
(what a concept!): if I prove my identity to you (even with several pieces
of government-approved ID), what does that tell you about my basic honesty?
I might just kill you for your wristwatch 30 seconds later.  
[/gwz]