eap Mailing List: Re: DISCUSS: draft-ietf-eap-netsel-problem

[Jari Arkko (jari.arkko]

Yes -- adding text on this issue would be very good.
Jouni, can you take a shot at writing such text?

Jari

Bernard Aboba kirjoitti:
> This is a very good point, and one that has come up in other contexts
> recently.
>
> The lack of a pre-configured profile is a very fundamental change
> which has multiple repercussions.  While the exposure of credentials
> can be solved by only allowing EAP methods meeting the criteria of RFC
> 4017, other problems are not as easy to deal with, such as determining
> whether the network or realm name advertised by the access point
> matches the credentials provided by the EAP server.   This issue has
> recently arisen not only with client unauthenticated access to
> Emergency Services (e.g. the EMU WG response to the IEEE 802.11u
> liaison request), but also in WiMAX, where the issue has arisen as to
> how the NSP ID can be verified during provisioning.
>
>> From: Tim Polk <tim.polk [at] nist.gov>
>> To: iesg [at] ietf.org
>> CC:
>> eap-chairs [at] tools.ietf.org,draft-ietf-eap-netsel-problem [at] 
>> tools.ietf.org
>> Subject: DISCUSS: draft-ietf-eap-netsel-problem Date: Thu, 01 Nov
>> 2007 10:43:41 -0400
>>
>> Discuss:
>> This discuss supports and expands Chris Newman's discuss with respect
>> to credential
>> selection and use.
>>
>> The introduction begins by noting current network access clients are
>> typically
>> preconfigured with access networks and corresponding identities and
>> credentials.
>> The document devotes a great deal of energy to the implications of
>> network
>> discovery on the "identity selection problem".  However, credential
>> selection is
>> viewed as simply another aspect of identity selection, and is treated
>> far less
>> rigorously.  I beleive that new security issues with respect to
>> credentials are
>> introduced by the move away from preconfigured access networks, and need
>> to be discussed in more detail.
>>
>> Given the difficulties in UI design that Chris has already
>> highlighted, I would
>> say that some credential types and authentication methods used with
>> preconfigured access networks will be inappropriate for use when network
>> discovery is employed.  Specifically, weaker credentials and mechanisms
>> that reveal something about the credential would seem to be a bad idea.
>>
>> I believe that additional material in the body (either in 2.2 or in a
>> new
>> subsection 2.x) is needed, as well as an expansion of the security
>> considerations section.
>
>
>