| Re: Issue 404: Peer-Id & Server-Id in Tunneled Methods | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
|
From: Bernard Aboba (bernard_aboba |
|
| Date: Sun, 21 Oct 2007 07:12:08 -0700 (PDT) | |
The text of Issue 404 is enclosed below. The suggested resolution is based
on the following assumption:
"The purpose of the Peer-Id and Server-Id is to identify the entities that
were involved in the creation of EAP keying material. Within a tunnel method the
EAP keying material could be derived solely from the outer authentication
(as in EAP-TTLSv0), or it could be derived from a combination of the outer
and inner exchanges.
The question is whether the "authenticated identity" referred to here is the Peer-Id or not, and if it is the Peer-Id, whether this creates any issues for use of tunneled methods such as EAP-TTLSv0 within IKEv2.
1. The EAP-Response/Identity (or in the case of IKEv2, IDi). This identity is typically not modified by AAA proxies along the authentication path, so that original decorations if present, remain. Example: juniper.net!pfunk [at] bt.com
2. The User-Name. The EAP-Response/Identity is placed in the User-Name attribute by the NAS, but may be processed by AAA proxies in order to remove decoration, so that by the time it arrives at the AAA server it is different from the EAP-Response/Identity. Example: pfunk [at] juniper.net.
Note that identities #1 and #2 are present in *all* EAP methods, regardless of whether they generate keys. Identity #3 is only present in key-generating methods (at least according to the suggested resolution of this issue).
I believe that RFC 4718 Section 3.5 above is actually talking about the User-Name attribute, not the Peer-Id. Since the User-Name attribute (or CUI) can be included in an Access-Accept, no new functionality is required within the AAA protocol to satisfy the requirement.
However, EAP methods are not shown to export the User-Name within the figures, so perhaps this should be added.
"The purpose of the Peer-Id and Server-Id is to identify the entities that
were involved in the creation of EAP keying material. Within a tunnel method the
EAP keying material could be derived solely from the outer authentication
(as in EAP-TTLSv0), or it could be derived from a combination of the outer
and inner exchanges.
Where the EAP keying material is derived solely from the outer exchange, the Peer-Id and Server-Id is determined based on the identities authenticated in the outer exchange. If the EAP keying material is derived from both the outer and inner exchanges, then the Peer-Id and Server-Id are determined based on the identities authenticated in both exchanges."
It has been asked how this relates to RFC 4718 Section 3.5, which states:
"3.5. Identity for Policy Lookups When Using EAP
When the initiator authentication uses EAP, it is possible that the contents of the IDi payload is used only for AAA routing purposes and selecting which EAP method to use. This value may be different from the identity authenticated by the EAP method (see [EAP], Sections 5.1 and 7.3).
It is important that policy lookups and access control decisions use the actual authenticated identity. Often the EAP server is implemented in a separate AAA server that communicates with the IKEv2 responder using, e.g., RADIUS [RADEAP]. In this case, the authenticated identity has to be sent from the AAA server to the IKEv2 responder.
(References: Pasi Eronen's mail "RE: Reauthentication in IKEv2", 2004-10-28. "Policy lookups" thread, Oct/Nov 2004. RFC 3748, Section 7.3.)"
The question is whether the "authenticated identity" referred to here is the Peer-Id or not, and if it is the Peer-Id, whether this creates any issues for use of tunneled methods such as EAP-TTLSv0 within IKEv2.
There are three user identities involved in an EAP/AAA conversation:
1. The EAP-Response/Identity (or in the case of IKEv2, IDi). This identity is typically not modified by AAA proxies along the authentication path, so that original decorations if present, remain. Example: juniper.net!pfunk [at] bt.com
2. The User-Name. The EAP-Response/Identity is placed in the User-Name attribute by the NAS, but may be processed by AAA proxies in order to remove decoration, so that by the time it arrives at the AAA server it is different from the EAP-Response/Identity. Example: pfunk [at] juniper.net.
3. The Peer-Id.
Note that identities #1 and #2 are present in *all* EAP methods, regardless of whether they generate keys. Identity #3 is only present in key-generating methods (at least according to the suggested resolution of this issue).
I believe that RFC 4718 Section 3.5 above is actually talking about the User-Name attribute, not the Peer-Id. Since the User-Name attribute (or CUI) can be included in an Access-Accept, no new functionality is required within the AAA protocol to satisfy the requirement.
However, EAP methods are not shown to export the User-Name within the figures, so perhaps this should be added.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Issue 404: Peer-Id & Server-Id in Tunneled Methods Submitter name: Paul Funk Submitter email address: pfunk [at] juniper.net Date Submitted: April 7, 2007 Reference: http://lists.frascone.com/pipermail/eap/msg04709.html Document: KEYING-18 Comment type: Technical Priority: S Section: Various Rationale/Explanation of issue:
Review of the EAP-TTLSv0 specification has raised some questions about how the Peer-Id is determined for tunneled methods:
1. What if multiple identities are being authenticated? EAP-TTLSv0 can handle both mutual authentication in phase I (via certificates) as well as one or more inner methods. Are multiple Peer-Ids returned in this case, or is there only one (or none)?
2. What if Phase I used only server authentication and the inner method doesn't export a Peer-Id (e.g. EAP-MD5). Does the tunneled method return the null Peer-Id in this case?
3. Do Peer-Ids have a type?
-
Re: Issue 404: Peer-Id & Server-Id in Tunneled Methods Bernard Aboba, October 21 2007
- Re: Issue 404: Peer-Id & Server-Id in Tunneled Methods Bernard Aboba, October 21 2007
Results generated by Tiger Technologies using MHonArc.