eap Mailing List: Re: Issue 392: Authorization Issues

[Lakshminath Dondeti (ldondeti]

I was catching on this discussion and it occurred to me that we can 
generalize the following text a bit further:

Bernard Aboba wrote:
> Here is some revised text:
>
> 5.1.  Peer and Authenticator Compromise
>
>    Likewise, compromise of a
>    single authenticator MUST NOT compromise keying material held by any
>    other authenticator within the system.  

Does this mean we are ok with a key management system where compromise 
of two or more authenticators leads to the compromise of keys help by 
other authenticators?  I think not.

We could reword to say "compromise of one or more authenticators MUST 
NOT compromise keying material held by the rest of the authenticators 
within the system"  or something like that.

thanks Bernard,
Lakshminath