| Re: Proposed Resolution of Issue 361: Child Key Expiry | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Narayanan, Vidya (vidyan |
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| Date: Wed, 7 Jun 2006 13:34:01 -0700 (PDT) | |
> > If the EAP server has no control over the lifetime when EMSK > is used for a specific purpose, then it would be the time to > think about possibility to use a mechanism other than EAP for > that purpose. > The EAP server never actually has control over the lifetime of a key that it has handed out to other parties. Even with the MSKs, it is only a guidance. The authenticator may enforce a lifetime based on its policy. So, the question really is about whether the guidance provided should be the same regardless of the purpose of the key. Vidya
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Re: Proposed Resolution of Issue 361: Child Key Expiry Narayanan, Vidya, June 7 2006
- Re: Proposed Resolution of Issue 361: Child Key Expiry Yoshihiro Ohba, June 7 2006
- Re: Proposed Resolution of Issue 361: Child Key Expiry Bernard Aboba, June 7 2006
- Re: Proposed Resolution of Issue 361: Child Key Expiry Narayanan, Vidya, June 7 2006
- Re: Proposed Resolution of Issue 361: Child Key Expiry Narayanan, Vidya, June 7 2006
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