| RE: Issue 339: Use of Session-Timeout in Pre-authentication | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Nakhjiri Madjid-MNAKHJI1 (Madjid.Nakhjiri |
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| Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2006 14:30:24 -0700 (PDT) | |
It would seem that the ISP would loose money if it gives 1 hr 10 minutes, while charging for 1 hr. On the other hand if the user has a session that she knows will be 1 hr, then and I am guessing the peer client has no idea about session timeout value... -----Original Message----- From: Bernard Aboba [mailto:bernard_aboba [at] hotmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, March 29, 2006 7:47 PM To: jari.arkko [at] piuha.net Cc: eap [at] frascone.com Subject: Re: [eap] Issue 339: Use of Session-Timeout in Pre-authentication Here is a scenario: The home server wants to allow a maximum session time of 1 hour, but would like the pre-authentication cache entry to remain for only 10 minutes so as to avoid over-using resources. So they send a Session-Timeout value of 1 hour, and a Preauth-Timeout value of 10 minutes. If the Session-Timeout value applies only once the session is started, then it is possible that the total lifetime will be 1 hour + 10 minutes. Another way to approach this is to let Session-Timeout count down and so if the session starts at 9 minutes then the remaining Session-Timeout would be 51 minutes. The issue with this is that the ISP cannot know what the exact Session-Timeout will be; they can only know it will be something between 0 and Session-Timeout - Preauth-Timeout. >From: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko [at] piuha.net> >To: Bernard Aboba <bernard_aboba [at] hotmail.com> >CC: eap [at] frascone.com >Subject: Re: [eap] Issue 339: Use of Session-Timeout in >Pre-authentication >Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2006 21:12:53 +0300 > >I think I agree with your intent. However, can we add something about >the fact that such modifications should never INCREASE the lifetime >beyond Session-Timeout? I think that's something that should hold, no? > >Bernard Aboba wrote: > > >> I actually liked the old text since it was very clear: ALL exported > >> keys expire at Session-Timeout time, no exceptions. This seems to > >> make sense, still. > >> > >> I do agree that it might make sense to have additional lifetimes > >> specified for the preauth case, but I see those as additional > >> constraints rather than something that replaces Session-Timeout. > > > > > > I think the issue is how to specify *both* the Session-Timeout and > > the pre-auth timeout. If only Session-Timeout is included, the > > meaning is clear -- all keys expire when Session-Timeout runs out. > > However, if a pre-auth timeout attribute is included then the > > question is how to specify the maximum lifetime of the session, as > > opposed to the key lifetime. I'd like to leave some wiggle room for future documents. > > > > How about this? > > > > "Where EAP is used for pre-authentication, the session may not start > > until some future time, or may never occur. Nevertheless, the > > Session-Timeout value represents the maximum time after which > > transported EAP keying material, and all keys calculated from it, > > will have expired on the authenticator. If the session subsequently > > starts, re-authentication will be initiated once the Session-Time > > has expired. If the session never started, or started and ended, by > > default keys transported by AAA and all keys calculated from them > > will be expired by the authenticator prior to the future time > > indicated by Session-Timeout. > > Note that in future additional attributes may be specified to > > control the lifetime of cached keys; these attributes may modify the > > meaning of the Session-Timeout attribute in specific circumstances." > > > > > > > > > > _________________________________________________________________ To unsubscribe or modify your subscription options, please visit: http://lists.frascone.com/mailman/listinfo/eap Arhives: http://lists.frascone.com/pipermail/eap
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