eap Mailing List: Re: Strawman -10/EMSK deletion requirement?

[Jari Arkko (jari.arkko]

Glen Zorn (gwz) wrote:

>
>>>      
>>>
>>The problem is that since EMSK is the root, its compromise will lead
>>to the compromise of all derived keys. This also holds locally for
>>the AMSK_root_0 approach. That is, if AMSK_root_0 is compromised then
>>any keys derived from that root are compromised (but not keys in
>>other apps).    
>>    
>>
>
>I guess I'm just confused, then (not a first!).  I thought that the major 
>problem was that it is basically impossible to no which (if any) 
>_applications_ a person would choose to use during a session.  If that is 
>accurate, I can't really see how the AMSK_root_0 approach solves the problem.  
>If that's not the problem, what is?
>  
>
Oh. Maybe I was confused. AMSK_root_0 does not solve that
problem. It solves the problem that if your application requires
multiple keys (as in fast handoff to AP2, AP3, etc) then you still
only need one AMSK from the EMSK for the application. That
AMSK_root_0 can then be used to generate all the keys that
the application in question needs.

--Jari