eap Mailing List: Re: Proposed Resolution to Issue 316: Counter Length

[Jari Arkko (jari.arkko]

Ok.

Bernard Aboba wrote:

> The text of Issue 316 is available here:
> http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/eapissues3.html#Issue%20316
>
> The Proposed Resolution is as follows:
>
> The proposed resolution is as follows:
>
> In Section 5.8, change:
>
> "Lower Layer
>    The lower layer Secure Association Protocol MUST generate a fresh
>    session key for each session, even if the keying material and
>    parameters provided by EAP methods are cached, or the peer or
>    authenticator lacks a high entropy random number generator.  A
>    RECOMMENDED method is for the peer and authenticator to each
>    provide a nonce or counter of at least 128 bits, used in session
>    key derivation. "
>
> To:
>
> "Lower Layer
> The lower layer Secure Association Protocol MUST generate a fresh
> session key for each session, even if the keying material and
> parameters provided by EAP methods are cached, or the peer or
> authenticator lack a high entropy random number generator. A
> RECOMMENDED method is for the peer and authenticator to each
> provide a nonce or counter used in session key derivation.
> If a nonce is used, it is RECOMMENDED that it be at least 128 bits."
>
>
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