eap Mailing List: RE: PANA and EAP keying framework

[Bernard Aboba (bernard_aboba]

>      TSKs are generated using a Secure Association Protocol

Can you elaborate on this?  If the TSKs are generated via an IKE DH 
exchange, with the MSK used only for authentication (as in  IKEv2/EAP) then 
the TSKs are not dependent on the MSK and PFS is possible, right?

>      between the peer and and authenticator port

Not sure I understand this.   The SAP exchange is between the peer and 
authenticator, not between specific ports.  However, a result of the SAP 
exchange can be derivation of TSKs which are bound to specific ports.

>      Point), where both link-layer specific key exchange protocols and
>      IKE can be used as the Secure Association Protocol depending on
>      whether link-layer ciphering or IPsec is used between the peer
>      and the authenticator port.

What is a "link-layer specific key exchange protocol"?  Are we talking about 
existing SAPs such as 802.11i 4-way handshake, or something else?


>      The key scope and lifetime of the
>      TSKs are communicated from the authenticator to the peer.

How?  IKE does not define explicit lifetimes, nor does it care about key 
scope because it doesn't support caching.


>      The key scope is specified as a list of device identifiers of the
>      Enforcement Points.

This doesn't make sense where IKE is used as the SAP unless we are talking 
about MOBIKE (which can move SAs between addresses).