PANA and EAP keying framework
From: Yoshihiro Ohba (yohbatari.toshiba.com)
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2006 19:03:03 -0800 (PST)
Description of issue
Submitter name: Yoshihiro Ohba
Submitter email address: yohba [at] tari.toshiba.com
Date first submitted: Insert_Date_Here
Reference: 
Document: Keying Framework
Comment type: 'T'
Priority: '1'
Section: 2.3
Rationale/Explanation of issue: It would be useful to add some
description on how PANA handle the caching of EAP keying material and
the generation of transient session keys.

Requested change:

Add the following description in Section 2.3:

"
PANA 

     PANA [I-D.ietf-pana-pana] supports caching of the MSK, but not
     the EMSK, IV, Session-ID, Peer-ID or Server-ID.  In the PANA
     model [I-D.ietf-pana-framework], TSKs are generated using a
     Secure Association Protocol between the peer and and
     authenticator port (which is referred to as an Enforcement
     Point), where both link-layer specific key exchange protocols and
     IKE can be used as the Secure Association Protocol depending on
     whether link-layer ciphering or IPsec is used between the peer
     and the authenticator port.  The key scope and lifetime of the
     TSKs are communicated from the authenticator to the peer.  The
     key scope is specified as a list of device identifiers of the
     Enforcement Points.  Depending on the Secure Association
     Protocol in use, TSK rekey is possible without EAP
     re-authentication.
"

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