eap Mailing List: RE: EAP-AKA Key derivation

[Salowey, Joe (jsalowey]

At the time of development of EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM we received comments
on using a standard PRF.  This was the recommendation from NIST on a PRF
so we adopted it. I don't believe it to be any better or worse than PRF+
using HMAC-SHA1 used in IKEv2 but at the time PRF+ was not standardized.
SIM manufacturers have built EAP-SIM into smart cards, I don't remember
if this came as a request from them or not. 

Joe

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Thomas Otto [mailto:t.otto [at] sharevolution.de] 
> Sent: Monday, January 09, 2006 7:58 AM
> To: eap [at] frascone.com
> Subject: Re: [eap] EAP-AKA Key derivation
> 
> Hi Bernard, all,  
> 
> > It is very common for IETF specifications to reference cryptographic
> > functions defined outside of the IETF.  Examples include 
> AES and DES, both
> > of which are defined in NIST documents.
> 
> This may be, but in the IETF, also appropriate mechanisms 
> have been developed.
> As I said before, for instance the prf+ in IKEv2. 
> 
> So why abstain from using this PRF? The HMAC construction 
> seems much more
> comprehensible than the DSS-PRF. 
> 
> Is there a particular advantage which I haven't recognized? 
> IS the DSS-PRF 
> built-in in the USIM, for instance? This would be an 
> argument, to re-use the
> implementation.
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