| Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Thomas Otto (t.otto |
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| Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2006 07:58:02 -0800 (PST) | |
Hi Bernard, all, > It is very common for IETF specifications to reference cryptographic > functions defined outside of the IETF. Examples include AES and DES, both > of which are defined in NIST documents. This may be, but in the IETF, also appropriate mechanisms have been developed. As I said before, for instance the prf+ in IKEv2. So why abstain from using this PRF? The HMAC construction seems much more comprehensible than the DSS-PRF. Is there a particular advantage which I haven't recognized? IS the DSS-PRF built-in in the USIM, for instance? This would be an argument, to re-use the implementation.
- Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation, (continued)
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Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation Thomas Otto, January 9 2006
- Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation Bernard Aboba, January 9 2006
- Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation Thomas Otto, January 9 2006
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Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation Thomas Otto, January 9 2006
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Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation Bernard Aboba, January 9 2006
- Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation Thomas Otto, January 9 2006
- Re: EAP-AKA Key derivation Thomas Otto, January 10 2006
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