| RE: Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Bernard Aboba (bernard_aboba |
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| Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2005 22:59:18 -0800 (PST) | |
I think the issue here is similar to the one brought up in Issue 313. An
EAP authenticator may be constructed in a variety of ways. Whether the
authenticator has multiple ports or a single port, involves multiple CPUs
or a single CPU, or even is constructed using lightweight APs and a WLAN
switch is not relevant to EAP.
For EAP purposes, an Authenticator is an entity that identifies itself with a single authenticator identity, both within the lower layer as well as in AAA. Neither the EAP peer nor the AAA server care about the details of how the authenticator is constructed, and neither should this document.
So when the document says that the "Authenticator and AAA cilent are co-resident" it means that both the Authenticator and AAA client share the same authenticator identity. This is required, because if it were not true then Channel Bindings would fail to verify. That's probably all we can or should say on this subject.
For EAP purposes, an Authenticator is an entity that identifies itself with a single authenticator identity, both within the lower layer as well as in AAA. Neither the EAP peer nor the AAA server care about the details of how the authenticator is constructed, and neither should this document.
So when the document says that the "Authenticator and AAA cilent are co-resident" it means that both the Authenticator and AAA client share the same authenticator identity. This is required, because if it were not true then Channel Bindings would fail to verify. That's probably all we can or should say on this subject.
From: "Salowey, Joe" <jsalowey [at] cisco.com> To: <eap [at] frascone.com> Subject: [eap] Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2005 15:14:01 -0800
Submitter name: Joe Salowey Submitter email address: jsalowey [at] cisco.com Date first submitted: 12/1/2005 Reference: Document: Keying Framework Comment type: 'T'echnical Priority: '1' Should fix Section: 2.2 Rationale/Explanation of issue:
The document states
"In order to prevent the compromise of transported EAP keying material and parameters, the AAA client and EAP authenticator MUST be co-resident."
It could be possible for the EAP authenticator to use another secure protocol other than a AAA protocol to transport EAP key material.
Requested change:
"In order to prevent the compromise of transported EAP keying material and parameters they MUST be securely transmitted from the entity that hosts the EAP server to the entity that hosts the EAP authenticator and makes use of the key material." _________________________________________________________________ To unsubscribe or modify your subscription options, please visit: http://lists.frascone.com/mailman/listinfo/eap
Arhives: http://lists.frascone.com/pipermail/eap
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Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material Salowey, Joe, December 1 2005
- RE: Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material Bernard Aboba, December 1 2005
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RE: Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material Salowey, Joe, December 2 2005
- Re: Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material Jari Arkko, December 13 2005
- RE: Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material Nakhjiri Madjid-MNAKHJI1, January 5 2006
- RE: Issue: Requirement on transport of EAP keying material Nakhjiri Madjid-MNAKHJI1, January 5 2006
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