issue: ciphersuites and key lengths (review of eap-keying-08 by mats naslund)
From: Jari Arkko (jari.arkkopiuha.net)
Date: Wed, 30 Nov 2005 21:30:29 -0800 (PST)
Submitter name: Mats Naslund
Submitter email address: Mats.Naslund [at] ericsson.com
Reference: (this email)
Document: Keying Framework
Comment type: T
Priority: 1
Section: multiple
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

  Ciphersuite Independence is a consequence of the principles of Mode
  Independence and Media Independence.

MN: I don't agree. Suppose that the MSK had been only 80 bits rather
than 64 bytes. We could then not have satsified security requirements
on 256-bit key cipher suites. Now, the MSK's 64 bytes are so huge
that it is sufficient for all "practical" cipher suites. But I still
claim it does not follow as a consequnce from Mode and Media independence
alone. There is an implict assumption that enough "key entropy"
is available.


Since the ciphersuites used to protect data depend on the lower layer, requiring EAP methods have knowledge of lower layer ciphersuites would compromise the principle of Media Independence.

MN: yes, to avoid needing to know key requirements, the MSK
has been chosen to be "large enough for all practical use"

  Since ciphersuite negotiation occurs in the lower layer, there is no
  need for ciphersuite negotiation within EAP, and EAP methods generate
  keying material that is ciphersuite-independent.

MN:...thanks to the fact that the MSK is so large.


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