EAP Keying Framework - section 1.4.1
From: Thomas Otto (t.ottosharevolution.de)
Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2005 06:15:13 -0800 (PST)
In section 1.4.1, Mode independence, the draft says:

   While the authenticator may implement some EAP methods locally and
   use those methods to authenticate local users, it may at the same
   time act as a pass-through for other users and methods, forwarding
   EAP packets back and forth between the backend authentication server
   and the peer. 

How can the authenticator (in context of 802.11: the access point) then 
decide which authentication it should do self and which authentication to
relay to the backend authentication server?

Both MAC address of the peer and identity, delivered in EAP-Response/
Identity(id) are no good choice, because they can easily be forged.

Thomas

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