| Re: Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Bernard Aboba (bernard_aboba |
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| Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2005 16:43:08 -0500 (EST) | |
From what I can recall, our earlier discussions about this focused on the MSK. I'm not sure the same should apply on AMSKs, particularly when we haven't defined what they are used for.
The principle is a general one -- if a key that is transported is to be used for derivation of TSKs that are only to be known to the EAP peer and authenticator who need to be able to mutually authorize each other, then that same key cannot also continue to be held by the AAA server. If the AAA server continues to hold the key, then the TSKs will also be known by the AAA server; also, the peer cannot know whether the entity proving possession of keying material is the EAP authenticator, or an imposter such as the AAA server.
As an example, the Secure Association Protocol relies on mutual proof of possession of keying material to enable the EAP peer and authenticator to determine that they are mutually authorized. If the keying material used for proof could also possessed by other parties then mutual authorization is not demonstrated -- the EAP peer could be talking to the AAA server or a proxy instead of the EAP authenticator.
As a result, without key deletion, the EAP peer and authenticator no longer demonstrate authorization; neither the transported keys nor the derived TSKs are uniquely held; the scope of
transported keys and TSKs is undefined; even Channel Bindings become open to forgery. About the only thing that can still be asserted about the exchange is that the TSKs are fresh -- although it's questionable how valuable this is if the other properties are absent.
But it seems possible to hand keys to lower layers (e.g. AAA server side logic) that are themselves branching of to number of subkeys. E.g. "the master handoff key for session xyz". The entity holding such an AMSK can then branch it to, e.g., "the i:th handoff key for NAS abc". There's a lot of room to do various designs, including proxy, AAA-server etc. based caching.
Right. I think this solves the problem.
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Eap keying review: use of MSK/ EMSK for AMSK creation Nakhjiri Madjid-MNAKHJI1, November 1 2005
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RE: Eap keying review: use of MSK/ EMSK for AMSK creation Bernard Aboba, November 1 2005
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Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Bernard Aboba, November 1 2005
- Re: Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Jari Arkko, November 1 2005
- Re: Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Bernard Aboba, November 1 2005
- Re: Re: Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Jari Arkko, November 1 2005
- Re: Re: Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Mohan Parthasarathy, November 2 2005
- Re: Re: Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Bernard Aboba, November 2 2005
- Re: Re: Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Mohan Parthasarathy, November 3 2005
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Issue: AAA Key Caching effectively prohibited? Bernard Aboba, November 1 2005
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RE: Eap keying review: use of MSK/ EMSK for AMSK creation Bernard Aboba, November 1 2005
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