The end of the keying hierarchy...
From: Bernard Aboba (bernard_abobahotmail.com)
Date: Fri, 21 Oct 2005 00:28:29 -0400 (EDT)
Jari Arkko said:

"My e-mail was a response to the discussion you and Joe had about Joe's comments to 2.6. I agree that we want to keep eap-keying as small as possible. But I think the practical alternatives are saying that the key hierarchy ends at EMSK (and leave rest of keying-extns) or that the hieararchy ends at AMSK (and leave all applications of AMSKs to keying-extns). I'd prefer the latter, but I could be persuaded to go for the former, too."

The EAP key hierarchy "ends" with the keying material passed to the lower layer. One attraction of passing the EMSK to the lower layer is that this implies that the calculation of AMSKs is purely a lower layer issue, and not something that the EAP layer needs to be concerned about. However, allowing the EMSK to be passed to the lower layer in some circumstances (stand-alone) but not in others (pass-through) violates the principle of Mode independence, so I don't think we can allow this.

Of course, the transformation of the Method-ID => Session-ID and EMSK => AMSK within the EAP layer does imply functionality within the EAP layer that is not envisaged in RFC 3748, so we need to think this over a bit. Essentially we are saying that the EAP layer is shielding EAP methods from writing into each other's Session-ID space, guarding against compromise of the EMSK by lower layers,
and in general becoming something of a "security policeman" for EAP.


Joe said:

"My concern with the above is that you may not want all of the authenticator to have access to the EMSK. You would probably want it to remain with the part of the authenticator that hosts the EAP server."

In the case where EAP runs standalone, the EAP authenticator *is* the EAP server. In the case of passthrough, the EAP authenticator doesn't host the EAP server, although it is co-resident with the AAA client. So I guess I'm not understanding your comment.

Maybe this has to do with the flow of keying material/attributes in the standalone case? In order to preserve mode independence, I think that the keying material needs to be processed the same way it would be if EAP were being run standalone.



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