eap Mailing List: Re: Issue 302: Clarifications on the "Domino Effect"

[Bernard Aboba (aboba]

A number of questions have arisen relating to this and other requirements.
Previously all we had had for reference was RFC 4017, which was based
on Russ Housley's presentation at IETF 56.

Now in addition we have an I-D entitled "AAA Key Management":
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-00.txt

Here what this document says about the Domino Effect:

"Compromise of a single authenticator MUST NOT compromise any
other part of the system, especially session keys and long-term
keys.  There are many implications of this requirement;
however, two implication deserves highlighting.  First, an
authenticator MUST NOT share any keying material with another
authenticator.  Second, the scope of the authenticator needs to
be defined and understood by all parties that communicate with it."


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Issue 302: Clarifications on the "Domino Effect"
Submitter name: Julien Bournelle
Submitter email address: julien.bournelle [at] int-evry.fr
Date first submitted: 5/4/2005
Reference: http://mail.frascone.com/pipermail/eap/2005-May/003390.html
Document: KEYING-06
Comment type: T
Priority: S
Section: Various
Rationale/Explanation of issue
 In RFC4017, the Domino effect is described:

 "Compromise of a single authenticator cannot compromise any other part
 of the system, including session keys and long-term secrets."

 Does this finally imply that the authenticator MUST not provide keys to
 other entity ?