| Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Yoshihiro Ohba (yohba |
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| Date: Tue, 17 May 2005 01:47:54 -0400 (EDT) | |
On Sun, May 15, 2005 at 05:57:05PM -0700, Bernard Aboba wrote: > Here is some revised text which adds in support for Channel Bindings, > removes the dangling AAA references, and cleans up other miscellaneous > issues. Next, I'll work on cleaning up the text relating to the lower > layer. (snip) > > Key Naming > > The naming of keys within the EAP key hierarchy is based on the EAP > Session-ID. I have a fundamental question on why we need to define a name to each of key derived from a given SA. This question has came up while I was reviewing IEEE 802.16e document in which a bunch of key names are defined. For example, in RFC 2401, an IPsec SA is identified with three parameters, i.e., an SPI, an Destination IP Address and a security protocol(*). What is the importance of concatenating those parameters into a string? Also, an IPsec SA has several ciphering keys such as encryption keys and integriry keys, but once an SA is identified with the above parameters, I don't see an importance to give a name to each ciphering key within the SA. It seems to me that defining, for each SA type, a set of parameters that are needed to identifiy an SA among different SAs of the same type, seems to be important and sufficient. Giving a name to every key that belongs to the same SA does not make much sense. (*) In rfc2401bis, an IPsec SA is identified just with an SPI. Yoshihiro Ohba > > MSK Name > > This key is created between the EAP peer and EAP server, and can > be referred to using the string "MSK:", concatenated with the EAP > Session-ID. > > EMSK Name > > The EMSK can be referred to using the string "EMSK:", concatenated > with the EAP Session-ID. > > IV Name > > Use of the IV is deprecated. However, if necessary the IV can be > referred to using the string "IV:" concatenated with the EAP > Session-ID. > > PMK Name > > This document does not specify a naming scheme for the PMK. The > PMK is only identified by the key from which it is derived. > > Note: IEEE 802.11i names the PMKID for the purposes of being able > to refer to it in the Secure Association protocol; this naming is > based on a hash of the PMK itself as well as some other parameters > (see Section 8.5.1.2 [IEEE-802.11i]). > > TEKs > > The TEKs may or may not be named. Their naming is specified in the > EAP method. >
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Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 11 2005
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Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Jari Arkko, May 12 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 12 2005
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Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 15 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Yoshihiro Ohba, May 16 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 17 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Yoshihiro Ohba, May 17 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 17 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Yoshihiro Ohba, May 17 2005
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Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Jari Arkko, May 12 2005
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