| Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Jari Arkko (jari.arkko |
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| Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 03:32:39 -0400 (EDT) | |
Bernard Aboba wrote:
--Jari
I think we need to be clear about which layer learns this information. The EAP method layer is aware of the identities provided in the EAP-Response/Identity but according to RFC 3748 should be using its own method-specific identities instead; these are exported as the Peer-ID and Server-ID. From the perspective of EAP, I think those are the only relevant identities.
It is the EAP lower layer that is aware of the authenticator identity because this identity is only communicated at the lower layer. The diagram doesn't describe the Authenticator-Identity as being passed to the EAP method, and existing methods wouldn't make use of it, so I'm assuming that the EAP method doesn't obtain this or care about it.
Yes, you are right. The EAP method may in some cases transport information about these, but if it does, it should do it so as opaque data.
--Jari
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence, (continued)
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Jari Arkko, May 13 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Yoshihiro Ohba, May 16 2005
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RE: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Salowey, Joe, May 12 2005
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RE: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 12 2005
- Re: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Jari Arkko, May 13 2005
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RE: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 12 2005
- RE: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Salowey, Joe, May 13 2005
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RE: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Salowey, Joe, May 13 2005
- RE: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence Bernard Aboba, May 13 2005
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