RE: Key derivation and the principle of equivalence
From: Bernard Aboba (abobainternaut.com)
Date: Fri, 13 May 2005 02:12:59 -0400 (EDT)
> [Joe] Yes, It seems that the peer (or the entity hosting the peer) can
> know the identity of the of the party it is communicating with and
> possibly determine that it is an EAP-Server vs. an Authenticator.
> However the basic method operation and communication should be the same.
> It seems a method shouldn't change its behavior if it is running on a
> EAP server vs. an authenticator.  I think it is possible that context
> data exported from the method may be interpreted differently by
> processes external to EAP.

I think we need to be clear about which layer learns this information.
The EAP method layer is aware of the identities provided in the
EAP-Response/Identity but according to RFC 3748 should be using its own
method-specific identities instead; these are exported as the Peer-ID and
Server-ID.  From the perspective of EAP, I think those are the only
relevant identities.

It is the EAP lower layer that is aware of the authenticator identity
because this identity is only communicated at the lower layer.  The
diagram doesn't describe the Authenticator-Identity as being passed to the
EAP method, and existing methods wouldn't make use of it, so I'm assuming
that the EAP method doesn't obtain this or care about it.

The authenticator identity is important to the lower layer because it uses
that information to organize its key cache and figure out whether it
already has keying material relating to a particular authenticator or not.

> [Joe] I think it would really be good to avoid fast handoff discussion
> in this part of the document.

Right.  I think the focus is to clearly articulate how things work and
what the constraints are.

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