Hi
Thomas,
Thanks for being
among helpful "other people" J
Ok, I am not sure how
fast re-authentication protects the use identity, so I can understand if no
protection is provided, that would be one way to protect the permanent
identities such as IMSI.
But what I don't
understand is how every use of IMSI means use of new
triplets?
Sure EAP-SIM draft
says that it does not allow re-use of triplets (I guess for full
authentication), but from what I understand the fast re-authentication does
not use any triplets, so the question of "re-use versus using fresh" should be
moot.
I do have another
issue with the fast re-auth. Most of the sequence charts only show a peer and
an authenticator. Does this mean the authenticator is the NAS or that it is
the EAP server? I am trying to understand how this fits into a 3 party EAP
authentication model and whether the fast re-authentication can apply to
handovers or it is just re-authentication to the same
authenticator?
Regards,
Madjid
-----Original
Message-----
From: Thomas
Wieland [mailto:twieland [at] cisco.com]
Sent: Wednesday, April 06, 2005 2:41
AM
To: Nakhjiri
Madjid-MNAKHJI1
Cc:
eap [at] frascone.com; henry.haverinen [at] nokia.com
Subject: Re: [eap] EAP-SIM fast re-auth
identity
Hi Madjid,
I'm not an author but
"other people", but maybe I can shed
some light on this. Henry can
always correct and expand.
There is nothing "wrong" with the identities
used during full
authentication (i.e. either permanent identity, e.g. 1IMSI
@realm,
or pseudonym identity). The "problem", if you will, is that
by
definition of a full authentication, these identities require the
use
of 2 or 3 GSM triplets to authenticate.
For one, this implies at
least one round trip to a remote server,
i.e. the HLR/AuC where the
triplets are generated. This is
usually much slower than going
through the calculations
necessary to iterate the keying material locally
at the AAA
server. It also means additional load on the
HLR/AuC.
The second "bad" aspect is that each full EAP-SIM
authentication uses
up 2 or 3 triplets. The number of triplets that
can be generated by each
SIM is usually limited (e.g. to 50,000) due to
security concerns. This
doesn't matter too much in a GSM mobile
network as authentications
only use only one triplet and occur relatively
infrequently compared to,
for example, public WLAN. For EAP-SIM used
in a PWLAN scenario,
not only do you use up 2 or 3 triplets per
authentication, the authentications
also happen much more
frequently. For example every time every time
a PC gets turned on
(or woken up), when a user roams between access
points etc. You can
see how you could be chewing through the available
triplets pretty fast and
once you've reached the limit hard-wired into the
SIM, your SIM is dead and
needs to be replaced.
By using the fast re-auth mechanism, not
only do you speed up
EAP-SIM authentications (hence "fast" :-), you also
reduce the
load on the back-end server (AuC) and extend the life of your
SIM.
In other words, "it's a good thing".
Regards,
Thomas
At 10:05 05-04-05 -0500, Nakhjiri Madjid-MNAKHJI1
wrote:
Hi,
I have a
question regarding the EAP-SIM method for fast re-authentication and would
appreciate it if the authors and other people respond. Why is a specific
identity used for fast re-authentication? What is the problem with using the
identities that were used during the full authentication? The initial identity
that is sent in EAP-Response/ Identity should not have a problem,
right?
Thanks in
advance,
Madjid
Nakhjiri