RE: [Fwd: Re: [eap] EAP Proxy question in context of 802.16e]
From: Nakhjiri Madjid-MNAKHJI1 (Madjid.Nakhjirimotorola.com)
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2005 17:11:44 -0500 (EST)
Hi, 

Comments in line.

Regards,

Madjid

-----Original Message-----
From: eap-admin [at] frascone.com [mailto:eap-admin [at] frascone.com] On 
Behalf Of Bakshi, Sanjay
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 12:22 PM
To: Dondeti, Lakshminath
Cc: eap [at] frascone.com
Subject: RE: [Fwd: Re: [eap] EAP Proxy question in context of 802.16e]

Hi Lakshminath,
Please see my comments.
Thanks,
sanjay

<snip>

>>>
>>> A few questions to set the stage for this discussion:
>>>
>>> 1. The EAP keying framework already defines (Section 2.3 in
>>> eap-keying-05 for instance) a key derivation mechanism to facilitate
>>> fast handoff. Specifically, there are key derivation functions
defined
>>> for multiple APs or the 16e case BSs. However, that I-D does not
>>> separate the Authenticator and the BS/AP functionality.

[<<sbakshi>>] You are correct, but this is still in the draft state and
I am not aware of any existing implementations today. Also, I am not
sure if there have been any studies done with respect to how many
authenticators can be supported in this manner. If authenticator is on
the BS, then AAA server needs to be aware of and have trust
relationships with all the BS. 

Madjid>>As far as I understand, there are many EAP-based authentication methods 
out there that are using the 3-party model and I have never heard of an EAP 
implementation that has two hops from peer to NAS.
If the BS is not in touch with AAA server, and the authenticator is, then how 
does the AAA server know what BSs the authenticator has trust with?
Also The TBD part of Autheticator-BS protocol would be interesting. You can't 
use RADIUS or Diameter, because otherwise the 4-party model would be pointless, 
and you can't use 802.16 L2, since it is backhaul. So how can 802.16 specify an 
EAP model that does not have a protocol from its BS to the server.
If you do use RADIUS anyway, then you run into the proxy-chaining security 
problem for RADIUS.

>>>
>>> Q: Why is that model insufficient in the 16e architecture? What is
the
>>> reasoning behind separating the BS and the Authenticator
functionality
>>> and what is the relationship between the Authenticator and the BS? I
>>> am curious as to which entity holds which keys and how are keys
>>> delivered between the 4 entities.

[<<sbakshi>>] Firstly, I am not clear if there are 4 entities if BS is
just a relay from EAP messaging perspective. I have heard differing
opinions on this and would like a definitive answer to that. Per my
understanding of section 1.4.1 EAP has to be media independent. It just
has some assumptions on underlying layer and as long as those are met it
should not matter how EAP is carried.
I don't think model defined in eap-keying-05 is insufficient, but I have
some questions about its scalability and actual existing deployments.

Madjid>>It is media independent, but it does not say it is "number-of-hop" 
independent.


<snip>

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