eap Mailing List: RE: Issue 286: Security

[Glen Zorn (gwz) (gwz]

Jari Arkko <> supposedly scribbled:

> Here's an attempt to write some text that would address this
issue. I
> agree that the draft should define its area of applicability
better,
> and should talk about the security considerations of revealing
> network identities. 

This would work for me: I would _really_ like to end all this rather
coy dancing around the subject.  So, I would like the authors to
explain clearly, concisely and precisely (_in the document_, not in
the EAP list archives or some 3GPP document-in-progress, unless
those are referenced _in the document_) what the purpose of this
thing is, who is going to use it and why. Farooq has reminded us
several times that this is 3GPP; OK, then put that in title:
"Identity Selection in 3GPP Networks" or something.  As I mentioned
in an earlier message, I don't think that any of the hints are
actually necessary for roaming to function, especially those in
secondary identity requests.  I suspect (but don't _know_, since the
authors aren't telling) that this is actually to implement some kind
of AAA source-routing, possibly to support some legacy model of
circuit-switched accounting.  OK, fine.  Explain that, clearly mark
it as a 3GPP thing, make it Informational and let's be done with it.


> 
> Text: Add the following new text to the end of the abstract:
> 
>    The mechanism defined in this document is
>    primarily intended for advertising connectivity
>    to a limited number of entities that find such
>    advertisements of their presence useful.
> 
> Add the following new text before the
> last paragraph in Section 1.
> 
>    This mechanism is not generally applicable to
>    all access networks or all home or mediating networks.
>    Basic roaming and AAA routing mechanisms are normally
>    sufficient, and the identification hints are typically
>    useful only when there's too much ambiquity, or when
>    the scale of the roaming associations precludes
>    full automatic connectivity from all access networks
>    to all home networks. In such situations, a limited
>    number of identity hints can be provided. Even
>    in this case, it is required that the networks that
>    are listed in these hints consent to such
>    advertisements.
> 
> And add this to the Security Considerations section:
> 
>    Any information revealed either from the network
>    or client sides before authentication has occurred
>    can be seen as a security risk. For instance, revealing
>    the existence of network that uses a poor authentication
>    method can make it easier for attackers to discover
>    that such network can be accessed. As a result,
>    the consent of the network being described in the
>    hints is required before such hints can be sent.
> 
> Comments? Would this work for people?
> 
> --Jari
> _______________________________________________
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> eap [at] frascone.com
> http://mail.frascone.com/mailman/listinfo/eap

Hope this helps,

~gwz

Why is it that most of the world's problems can't be solved by
simply
  listening to John Coltrane? -- Henry Gabriel