| RE: Re: EAP-AKA review | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: henry.haverinen (henry.haverinen |
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| Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2004 03:28:29 -0400 (EDT) | |
Thanks, Yoshihiro. That looks good to me. Best regards, Henry > -----Original Message----- > From: ext Yoshihiro Ohba [mailto:yohba [at] tari.toshiba.com] > Sent: 18 October, 2004 06:31 > To: Haverinen Henry (Nokia-ES/Jyvaskyla) > Cc: yohba [at] tari.toshiba.com; stephen.hayes [at] ericsson.com; > jari.arkko [at] piuha.net; eap [at] frascone.com > Subject: Re: [eap] Re: EAP-AKA review > > > Hi Henry, > > On Sun, Oct 17, 2004 at 03:21:51PM +0300, > henry.haverinen [at] nokia.com wrote: > > > > Hi Yoshihiro, > > > > Thanks for clarifying the issue, now I understand. Would > > the following change be an appropriate way of fixing this > > issue in your opinion: > > > > As discussed in Section 4.4, the peer will only accept > EAP-Success after > > successful authentication. Hence, the attacker cannot > force the peer to believe > > successful authentication has occurred when authentication > of the network > > failed or has not happened yet. > > Yes. More precisely something like ("authentication of the network" > is ambiguous to me): > > " > As discussed in Section 4.4, the peer will only accept EAP-Success > after the peer successfully authenticates the server. Hence, the > attacker cannot force the peer to believe successful mutual > authentication has occurred before the peer successfully authenticates > the server or after the peer failed to authenticate the server. > " > > Regards, > > Yoshihiro Ohba > > > > > Best regards, > > Henry > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: eap-admin [at] frascone.com > > > [mailto:eap-admin [at] frascone.com]On Behalf Of ext Yoshihiro Ohba > > > Sent: 15 October, 2004 20:22 > > > To: Haverinen Henry (Nokia-ES/Jyvaskyla) > > > Cc: yohba [at] tari.toshiba.com; stephen.hayes [at] ericsson.com; > > > jari.arkko [at] piuha.net; eap [at] frascone.com > > > Subject: [eap] Re: EAP-AKA review > > > > > > > > > Hi Henry, > > > > > > Please see my comment below. > > > > > > On Fri, Oct 15, 2004 at 06:18:42PM +0300, > > > henry.haverinen [at] nokia.com wrote: > > > > > > > > I have a question about the following comment in Section 9.6: > > > > > > > > > Because EAP-AKA is not a tunneling method, > > > EAP-Request/Notification, > > > > > EAP-Response/Notification, EAP-Success or EAP-Failure > > > packets are not > > > > > confidential, integrity protected or replay protected. > > > On physically > > > > > insecure networks, this may enable an attacker to mount > > > denial of > > > > > service attacks by spoofing these packets. As discussed > > > in Section > > > > > 4.4, the peer will only accept EAP-Success after successful > > > > > authentication. Hence, the attacker cannot force the > > > peer to believe > > > > > successful authentication has occurred when mutual > > > authentication > > > > > failed or has not happened yet. > > > > > > > > > >$ohba: This is true only when the optional > method-specific success > > > > >indication is used. > > > > > > > > This paragraph refers to section 4.4.4, which specifies the > > > processing > > > > of EAP-Success. In EAP-AKA, the peer authenticates > > > > the server already based on EAP-Request/AKA-Challenge or > > > > EAP-Request/AKA-reauthentication. > > > > Section 4.4.4 specifies for full authentication that > "The peer MUST > > > > silently discard any EAP-Success packets if they are > > > received before > > > > the peer has successfully authenticated the server and sent > > > the EAP-Response/ > > > > AKA-Challenge packet.". For fast re-authentication, > section 4.4.4 > > > > specifies that "The peer MUST silently discard any > > > EAP-Success packets > > > > if they are received before the peer has successfully > > > authenticated the > > > > server and sent the EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication packet.". > > > > > > > > To me it seems that the quoted text is true even if > method-specific > > > > success indication was not used. Do you agree? > > > > > > I agree that above quoted text taken from section 4.4.4 > is true even > > > if method-specific success indication was not used (and > thus there was > > > no comment in section 4.4.4). > > > > > > However, I don't think the text in section 9.6 precisely > refers to the > > > quoted text for the following reason: > > > > > > - The quoted text taken from section 4.4.4 discusses the peer's > > > behavior *before* the peer has successfully authenticated > the server. > > > The quoted text does not say anything about what the peer > should do > > > *after* the peer has successfully authenticated the server. > > > > > > - The text in section 9.6, i.e., "the peer will only accept > > > EAP-Success after successful authentication", discusses the peer's > > > behavior *after* the peer has successfully authenticated > the server. > > > > > > I think these two are different things. > > > > > > With regard to the peer's behavior *after* the peer has > successfully > > > authenticated the server, I have the following observation: > > > > > > Since the server *may or may not* succeed to validate the > > > EAP-Response/AKA-Challenge or EAP-Response/AKA-Reauthentication > > > message sent by the peer, the peer must be ready to accept both an > > > EAP-Success message (sent when the validation succeeds) and an > > > EAP-Request/AKA-Notification message (sent when the > validation fails), > > > if the method-specific success indication is NOT used. When the > > > server fails to validate the response, if an attacker sends an > > > EAP-Success message and the peer receives it before receiving an > > > EAP-Request/AKA-Notification message sent from the real > server, the > > > peer will end up with accepting the EAP-Success. Thus I > believe that > > > the following sentence in section 9.6 is not true: > > > > > > "Hence, the attacker cannot force the peer to believe successful > > > authentication has occurred when mutual authentication > failed or has > > > not happened yet." > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Yoshihiro Ohba > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Best regards, > > > > Henry > > > _______________________________________________ > > > eap mailing list > > > eap [at] frascone.com > > > http://mail.frascone.com/mailman/listinfo/eap > > > >
- RE: EAP-AKA review, (continued)
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RE: EAP-AKA review henry.haverinen, October 15 2004
- Re: EAP-AKA review Yoshihiro Ohba, October 15 2004
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RE: Re: EAP-AKA review henry.haverinen, October 17 2004
- Re: Re: EAP-AKA review Yoshihiro Ohba, October 17 2004
- RE: Re: EAP-AKA review henry.haverinen, October 18 2004
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RE: EAP-AKA review henry.haverinen, October 15 2004
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