| RE: Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Bernard Aboba (aboba |
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| Date: Sun, 10 Oct 2004 11:13:48 -0400 (EDT) | |
Right. So the question is whether 802.11i/EAP can be "properly configured" and if not, what changes need to be made to enable this. On Sun, 10 Oct 2004, Russ Housley wrote: > Bernard: > > There are many cases where protocols can be used in a manner that is > FIPS-compliant and also used in a manner that is not. Last week, NIST > published some draft guidance about TLS, but I have not had an opportunity > to review it in detail yet, but it does say: > > While SSL 3.0 is the most secure of the SSL protocol versions, it is > not approved for use in the protection of Federal information because it > relies in part on the use of cryptographic algorithms that are not > FIPS-Approved. TLS when properly configured is approved for the > protection of Federal information. > > The document includes recommended cipher suites for the protection of > government information. > > I do not think that NIST has published similar documentation for IPsec. > > Russ
- Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues, (continued)
- Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues Bernard Aboba, October 7 2004
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RE: Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues Walker, Jesse, October 7 2004
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RE: Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues Bernard Aboba, October 7 2004
- RE: Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues Russ Housley, October 10 2004
- RE: Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues Bernard Aboba, October 10 2004
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RE: Re: EAP-Keying Draft Issues Bernard Aboba, October 7 2004
- RE: EAP-Keying draft issues Alper Yegin, October 8 2004
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