Re: Issue on eap-keying: naming of AMSks
From: Florent Bersani (florent.bersanird.francetelecom.fr)
Date: Tue, 5 Oct 2004 10:29:57 -0400 (EDT)
Joe, Jari

Jari Arkko wrote:

First, I agree with Florent's suggested change.

But the issue you bring up Joe seems indeed a separate one,
or maybe even multiple ones:

o  We can require support of a specific naming scheme in EAP, but
   does this imply that the keys can only be referred to these names
   in other protocols, or are those protocols free to choose what
   they want? Other candidate naming schemes the protocols could used
   include a hash of the EAP defined name, a hash of the key itself,
   time of day when the key was created, and user's shoe size.

   Tentative suggestion: It seems sufficient that EAP provides keys
   and key names with the specified format and that applications can
   use this information or some other identifiers as best suits that
   particular application.

I agree. Perhaps we capture that in eap-keying. By including sth in the key naming section, saying that:
"It is RECOMMENDED that Applications use the key names defined in this document to refer to specific EAP Keying material, however applications may very well use their own naming scheme to refer to this keys"
Does that sound good?



o String concatenation names vs. hash results. Should we have short or long names, or possibly both? (Didn't we discuss this at one time? Or was it about the use of the keys themselves as a basis for the names?)

IIRC, the latter. It was feared that using some hash of the key to name it would lead to some vulnerability (e.g. brute force/dictionary attack).
I don't recall any definite conclusion on this one. My two cents: while their may be correct ways to do this (OWF), it is true that from an information theoretic PoV, there is some leakage, which probably accounts for this option not being conservative (if the hash function's one-wayness is in trouble then the key naming scheme is in great trouble).
I'll take this to the CFRG to get educated advice



Tentative suggestion 1: We could require the support and delivery of the specified long names from EAP point of view, but allow application protocols to perform a hash to shorten the name, if appropriate.

Tentative suggestion 2: Specify that names are hashes of the currently
defined strings. It seems that the issue of deciding which hash function
to use is not a problem, because we have already chosen a particular
function for the AMSK generation.

I'd favor #2
If we don't provide usable names. Applications will either define their own ones from scratch or hash ours (and make possibly some mistake here).
So I'd favor a 128 or 160 bit key name.



--Jari


It seems that the definition of the AMSK name may be up to the application
that is using the key. I suppose it is fine to define a name, but I'm not
sure it is good to expect application to use that name. This brings up
another topic. I think in many cases a fixed length name may be more useful
(perhaps this is an ID, who knows). The current naming schemes can lead to
long variable length names. I would rather (or also) like to see schemes
that result in a fixed length name (or ID).


eap-admin [at] frascone.com wrote:

Description of issue: should AMSK naming be mandatory?

Submitter name: Florent Bersani

Submitter email address: florent.bersani [at] francetelecom.com

Date first submitted: 10/04/2004

Document: Keying Framework

Comment type: 'E'ditorial

Priority: 1 should fix

Section: 2.4

Rationale/Explanation of issue:

section 2.4 reads: "AMSK Name

      AMSKs, if any, may be named by the concatenation of the string
      "AMSK", key label, application data (see Appendix F), and EMSK
Name."
However, I think it is sound practice to name keys. Since
AMSK are new,
we shouldn't be bothered with legacy reasons. Hence, why not
make this
AMSK naming "mandatory"



Requested change

Replace the previous text by
"AMSK Name

AMSKs, if any, are named by concatenating the string
"AMSK", key label, application data (see Appendix F), and EMSK
Name."





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