EAP-PAX draft update
From: T. Charles Clancy (clancycs.umd.edu)
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2004 13:16:52 -0400 (EDT)
I recently submitted -01 of draft-clancy-eap-pax to the IETF.  The HTML
version can be found here:

http://www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy/eap-pax/draft-clancy-eap-pax-01.html

Major problem in -00:  When using identity proteciton you had to know
whether to run PAX-Auth or PAX-Update before you knew the user's identity.
Without knowning the identity there was no way to know if a key update was
needed, and hence a paradox ensued.

Version -01 has some major changes to the protocol and draft itself:

1. separated in to two protocols, PAX_STD and PAX_IDP (identity
   protection) to solve the above mentioned problem
2. both are 2RT protocols, and can be used with or without DH for forward
   secrecy
3. mutual authentication is always performed
4. more implementation instruction for key updates to prevent
   desynchronization attacks
5. with the recent HMAC paranoia, added AES-CBC-MAC as a MAC, and
   internally define a PRF that doesn't use MD5
6. include appendices with suggested implementation and deployment
   strategies
7. lots of editorial revisions

[ t. charles clancy ]--[ tcc [at] umd.edu ]--[ www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy ]
[ computer science ]-----[ university of maryland | college park ]

  • (no other messages in thread)

Results generated by Tiger Technologies using MHonArc.