Re: eap identity request and radius user-name attribute
From: Srinivasa Rao Addepalli (sraointoto.com)
Date: Thu, 9 Sep 2004 12:28:33 -0400 (EDT)
We were doing similar brain-storming recently among us internally.

In wireless scenario (802.1x), Identity is not known to the
authenticator (Access Point, in this case) and in this case, EAP-Start
message can be sent to the RADIUS Server, which starts with
EAP-Identity phase.

In case of IKEv2, identity is already known and we were also not sure
whether EAP-Identity request would be honored by IKEv2 clients.
So, we finally decided to frame EAP-Identity Response (fake it) with
in Authenticator (Node running IKEv2 server) and send it via
RADIUS Access request to the RADIUS Server.


Our understanding is that, RADIUS Servers dont' start with EAP-Identity phase, if it knows the Identity of the peer. It is also our
understanding that, EAP-Identity response is accepted by the
RADIUS Servers, even if it did not initiate it. We are yet to convince
ourselves that this is the behaviour of all RADIUS Servers.


Srini
Intoto Inc.
www.intoto.com
----- Original Message ----- From: "Jari Arkko" <jari.arkko [at] piuha.net>
To: <eap [at] frascone.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 09, 2004 4:32 AM
Subject: [eap] eap identity request and radius user-name attribute




While discussing the use of IKEv2 in 3G networks with my colleagues, a question relating to EAP Identity Responses and RADIUS/Diameter EAP came up.

As background, IKEv2 specification says that the
EAP identity request/response exchange should
not be used. The identity of the client is
transported in the IKEv2 payloads instead.

The question is how this identifier is carried
to the AAA server. Presumably, the identifier
should go to the User-Name attribute in RADIUS.

According to RFC 3579, it is possible to set the
EAP-Payload attribute to an empty string, representing
EAP-Start. But what do typical AAA servers do in
this case, will they rely on the username from the
User-Name attribute, or issue an EAP Identity Request?
The latter would seem to be a violation of the
IKEv2 specifications. I think our EAP state machines
allow both behaviors, but I'm curious what the current
behaviour is in existing implementations.

Secondly, it was suggested that the IKEv2
node could synthethise an EAP Identity Response
packet and send that along in the EAP-Payload
attribute. That doesn't seem quite right either,
but would this break something? Are there EAP
methods that integrity protect EAP messages exchanged
earlier in the process?

--Jari

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