| Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: John Vollbrecht (jrv |
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| Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2004 11:23:26 -0400 (EDT) | |
A couple questions --
--On Tuesday, August 10, 2004 12:48 PM +0300 Pasi.Eronen [at] nokia.com wrote:
- John
--On Tuesday, August 10, 2004 12:48 PM +0300 Pasi.Eronen [at] nokia.com wrote:
Hi,-- so not a success failure sent because of administrative changes
To summarize the discussion about issue #251 at San Diego, the conclusion seemed to be that
- The "canned" success/failure prohibited by RFC3748 means success/failure sent immediately after a connection is established.
-- it does seem different. so not specifically prohibited.- The 1X-REV behavior of sending success/failure on administrative change is not totally in line with this.
ok - this seems reasonable- However, you could argue that those canned messages are not really part of an EAP conversation, but just use EAPOL frame type.
this doesn't seem to deal with the case where a port is taken down and up, sending a Success, and it may be in the middle of a conversation.- Perhaps using something else would have been prettier, but the current behavior doesn't seem to be that harmful either (e.g. if you disable the port, the client is not going to get access anyway), and it's too late to change it.
true - but this is not the administrative success/failure- EAP peer state machine discards canned success/failure (because "reqId == lastId" can't be true, since lastId is NONE). Thus, no changes required there.
I think this is a good idea
- EAP authenticator state machine does not explicitly mention that canned success/failure is prohibited. If desired, we could add something like "Policy.getDecision MUST comply with RFC3748 restrictions about canned Success and Failure messages." in author's 48 hours.
I also prefer the first alternative, but I think input from the list would be useful
- Sending success/failure after an identity request/response pair is allowed by RFC3748 (and is explicitly mentioned in an example). The peer can, of course, have a policy requiring authentication of the server.
I didn't notice this at San Diego, but additionally it seems that:
- The current version of EAP peer state machine does not accept a Success message after identity request (because decision is FAIL; this still worked in version -01 where decision could be also COND_SUCC).
- We could add text saying that "The peer state machine assumes that the peer's policy requires that an authentication method is always run. That is, an EAP Success message immediately following an EAP Identity or Notification exchange is ignored."
- Or, we could add a constant AllowImmediateSuccess, and change "decision = FAIL" to "if (AllowImmediateSuccess) decision = COND_SUCC; else decision = FAIL;" in the INITIALIZE state.
Comments? What should we do about the last item? (Personally, I'd prefer the first alternative, as we could add that at author's 48 hours.)
- John
Best regards, Pasi
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Proposed resolution of issue 251 Pasi.Eronen, August 10 2004
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Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 Jari Arkko, August 10 2004
- Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 Yoshihiro Ohba, August 10 2004
- Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 John Vollbrecht, August 10 2004
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Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? Mohamad Badra, August 10 2004
- Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? T. Charles Clancy, August 12 2004
- Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? Mohamad Badra, August 13 2004
- Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? T. Charles Clancy, August 15 2004
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Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 Jari Arkko, August 10 2004
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