| Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Yoshihiro Ohba (yohba |
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| Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2004 10:43:21 -0400 (EDT) | |
I prefer the latter approach (i.e., the one that uses AllowImmediateSuccess), too. Thanks, Yoshihiro Ohba On Tue, Aug 10, 2004 at 12:56:21PM +0300, Jari Arkko wrote: > Pasi.Eronen [at] nokia.com wrote: > >Hi, > > > >To summarize the discussion about issue #251 at San Diego, > >the conclusion seemed to be that > > > >- The "canned" success/failure prohibited by RFC3748 > > means success/failure sent immediately after a > > connection is established. > > > >- The 1X-REV behavior of sending success/failure on > > administrative change is not totally in line with this. > > > >- However, you could argue that those canned messages are not > > really part of an EAP conversation, but just use EAPOL frame > > type. > > > >- Perhaps using something else would have been prettier, but > > the current behavior doesn't seem to be that harmful either > > (e.g. if you disable the port, the client is not going to get > > access anyway), and it's too late to change it. > > > >- EAP peer state machine discards canned success/failure > > (because "reqId == lastId" can't be true, since lastId > > is NONE). Thus, no changes required there. > > > >- EAP authenticator state machine does not explicitly mention > > that canned success/failure is prohibited. If desired, we > > could add something like "Policy.getDecision MUST comply with > > RFC3748 restrictions about canned Success and Failure messages." > > in author's 48 hours. > > > >- Sending success/failure after an identity request/response > > pair is allowed by RFC3748 (and is explicitly mentioned > > in an example). The peer can, of course, have a policy > > requiring authentication of the server. > > Agreed. Thanks for the summary. > > >I didn't notice this at San Diego, but additionally it > >seems that: > > > >- The current version of EAP peer state machine does not accept > > a Success message after identity request (because decision is FAIL; > > this still worked in version -01 where decision could be also > > COND_SUCC). > > > >- We could add text saying that "The peer state machine assumes > > that the peer's policy requires that an authentication method > > is always run. That is, an EAP Success message immediately > > following an EAP Identity or Notification exchange is ignored." > > > >- Or, we could add a constant AllowImmediateSuccess, and > > change "decision = FAIL" to "if (AllowImmediateSuccess) > > decision = COND_SUCC; else decision = FAIL;" in the > > INITIALIZE state. > > Oops. I would actually prefer the latter. (Not sure why > you think only the former can be done in AUTH48.) > > --Jari > _______________________________________________ > eap mailing list > eap [at] frascone.com > http://mail.frascone.com/mailman/listinfo/eap
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Proposed resolution of issue 251 Pasi.Eronen, August 10 2004
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Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 Jari Arkko, August 10 2004
- Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 Yoshihiro Ohba, August 10 2004
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Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 Jari Arkko, August 10 2004
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Re: Proposed resolution of issue 251 John Vollbrecht, August 10 2004
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Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? Mohamad Badra, August 10 2004
- Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? T. Charles Clancy, August 12 2004
- Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? Mohamad Badra, August 13 2004
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Re: What about PSK with TLS and IKEv2? Mohamad Badra, August 10 2004
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