| Re: keying-03: issue 215 (sa terminology) | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Bernard Aboba (aboba |
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| Date: Sat, 17 Jul 2004 10:52:55 -0400 (EDT) | |
> At the moment at least I don't > see MSK lifetime being maintained by current systems. But I may > have missed something. It would appear to me that various AMSK applications (e.g. Bill Arbaugh's pre-emptive handoff work) seem to maintain such state. The question is: for how long? How do the parties negotiate the lifetime? For example, when AMSKs are derived from the EMSK, how long does the EMSK remain in the AAA server cache for this purpose? For example, if my host created an MSK & EMSK, then went to sleep and woke up the next day, are those key cache entries still valid for AMSK key derivation? Is there some implicit assumption that there is only one currently valid MSK/EMSK root from which AMSKs are derived, and once a new MSK/EMSK set is derived on the peer and server, then the previous hierarchy is invalidated? The problem is that EAP and EAP methods don't negotiate a lifetime for the EMSK/MSK, and neither does the EAP lower layer. This leaves these lifetimes (as well as lifetimes of derived quantities such as the AAA-Key and AMSKs) undefined after the completion of the EAP negotatiation. There have been proposals for including a Key-Lifetime within the AAA-Token, but that only helps in synchronization between the AAA server and authenticator. Where the AMSK (or even AAA-Key) is potentially cached, the peer needs to be able to guess whether that key remains valid at some future time. Things get even more messy if authorizations are provided along with the AAA-Token in order to restrict key scope or usage. In that case, the peer may be unaware not only of the key lifetime, but also its usage restrictions. I've been struggling with these issues in the Key Lifetime section, and seem to have come to the conclusion that the problem may not be solvable unless the Secure Association Protocol follows closely after the EAP conversation so as to allow the key lifetimes to be negotiated there. However, in architectures such as 802.11i there may be a (long?) hiatus between the two protocols, during which the key lifetimes are undefined on the peer.
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Re: keying-03: issue 215 (sa terminology) Bernard Aboba, July 17 2004
- Re: keying-03: issue 215 (sa terminology) Jari Arkko, July 17 2004
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