| Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Nick Petroni (npetroni |
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| Date: Fri, 16 Jul 2004 14:40:00 -0400 (EDT) | |
Florent, I certainly appreciate your opinion, but I hope you know that it is not me with whom you are disagreeing. I am simply explaining what I understand the constraints of this working group to be. I share your admonishment for using bad methods, but it has been my understanding from the beginning that these are our constraints. Sorry if this ruins your day :(. If I am wrong, someone else can certainly correct me freely. It has certainly happened on more than one occasion :). Take care, nick Nick L. Petroni, Jr. Graduate Student, Computer Science Maryland Information Systems Security Lab University of Maryland http://www.cs.umd.edu/~npetroni On Fri, 16 Jul 2004, Florent Bersani wrote: > Nick, > > see in-line > > Florent > > Nick Petroni wrote: > > >>This reflexion led me to the mechanism EAP-PSK currently uses to (try > >>to) end properly its dialog, see > >>http://perso.rd.francetelecom.fr/bersani/EAP_PSK/draft-bersani-eap-psk-03-d.html#rflag > >>for a presentation of this mechanism (sorry for this rude ad on EAP-PSK > >>but I think that what's in there could clarify my comment... and > >>possibly get me some feedback ;-)). > >> > >>After rereading the state machine draft , I believe that the text of > >>section 4.2 is pretty clear (congratulations ;-)). My only remaining > >>unanswered question is: do we want to keep COND_SUCC? > >> > >> > >I think the answer is we have to. Some methods simply will not know > >whether or not they are complete and actually must wait for Success or > >Failure or another request to be received. We cannot exclude (for > >legacy purposes) methods that cannot say for certain that they are not > >complete or do not know the success of the method itself. > > > Aaaaaaaaaaaaaarghn the L word in a protocol that apparently is becoming > pervasive for the future (invading IKEv2, IEEE 802.1X, IEEE 802.11, IEEE > 802.16e, and why not IEEE 802.20)! > > I am aware of what you say but I respectfully and strongly disagree.: if > EAP is going to be a protocol of the future why cripple it with problems > of the past. > > This being said (and I expected your answer), I won't keep bothering > with old (and given the point where we are now, slightly unconstructive) > remarks. > > > COND_SUCC is > >the only way to handle methods like MD5 where you have no idea if you > >authenticated correctly or not. you have to wait for success or failure. > > > > > Again I wish that MD5-Challenge would disappear ;-) > > > > > > >>... but I understand that I am probably *unfortunately* the only one to > >>have this position and that it is probably too late to change this > >>direction (don't worry, I am not going at this point to try and reopen > >>issues like #26 > >>http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/eapissues.html#Issue%2026 or others by > >>saying that the current EAP-Success/Failure packet is not only useless > >>but harmful ;-)) > >> > >> > >I don't think you could change it if you wanted to... I think the charter > >is pretty clear that existing methods can't be made obsolete. I could be > >wrong though. > > > > > No, no I think you are right > > > > > > >>As a fall-back solution, I would recommend inserting something like the > >>following text advising that COND_SUCC may be dangerous: > >> > >>"In case the peer reaches the decision COND_SUCC, please note that the > >>peer is vulnerable to an active attacker that may easily lead him to > >>believe that the authenticator has reached any decision the attacker > >>chooses. In situations where security is a concern, it is RECOMMENDED to > >>avoid using the value COND_SUCC of the decision variable" > >> > >> > >This would be a good recommendation to method writers I think, but I am > >not sure a general claim about setting that variable alone is enough. > > > I think that you have seen only the aspect: "a good EAP method SHOULD > provide protected result indications to avoid using COND_SUCC" but you > have overlooked the aspect "EAP peer and server SHOULD use only good EAP > methods" ;-) > > I agree that the EAP state machine is probably not the best doc for his > manifesto but since it is the State Machine that introduces COND_SUCC > (which is not mandated by RFC 3748), then I'd recommend providing > guidance on the usage of this "dangerous" variable. > > > We > >could add some guidelines for method authors in the Implementation > >Considerations section or perhaps better somewhere else? IMHO, the > >middle of the SM description is not the place to get into this. > > > > > The IEEE 802 requirements probably have a word on protected result > indications (I got to check that)... but I'd rather have IETF also state > its opinion on EAP methods (while this could be done in a future IETF > "how to design a good EAP method" document, I'd rather not count on the > future and do what is possible now ;-) >
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4, (continued)
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 Florent Bersani, July 15 2004
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Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 Florent Bersani, July 16 2004
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 Nick Petroni, July 16 2004
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 Florent Bersani, July 16 2004
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 Nick Petroni, July 16 2004
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 Jari Arkko, July 16 2004
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 Florent Bersani, July 17 2004
- Security considerations text in state machine draft (Was: Re: [eap] [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4) Jari Arkko, July 24 2004
- Re: [Issue 248] Comments on EAP state machine v4 John Vollbrecht, July 22 2004
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