| Re: draft on authenticated service identities | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Jari Arkko (jari.arkko |
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| Date: Wed, 14 Apr 2004 05:53:10 -0400 (EDT) | |
Thanks Alper for your comments. Some discussion inline:
I agree something needs to be done regarding binding the service to the authentication, and considering several service-related attributes is a necessity.
Good!
The attribute verification can be performed in different ways. I see your draft proposes it being done both on the peer and the authentication server. This is somewhat redundant, unless I'm missing something. Either peer or the auth. server could perform this verification and fail the AAA in case of discrepancy (modulo the policy). I guess giving the authority to perform this check and fail the session to each end give additional flexibility, but at the price of possibly increased complexity.
There appears to be two issues in here: transfering the information and checking it. I believe we should transfer the information both ways, because its likely that there's some case where, say, a lower layer is unable to transfer some information that the AAA protocols can. Such piece of information can not be checked, but it can still be valuable to inform the other side about it for audit trail or other purposes.
I think you are right about the check part, assuming that the method is capable of actually informing the other end about its decision. OTOH, it looks like having one side do the check would add a roundtrip in methods that currently don't inform the other end; I guess we wanted to make the extension very simple & have minimal assumptions about the method otherwise, even at the price of checking the same thing twice. Pasi, you have comments on this?
Also, performing the exchange of the attributes in-band with the EAP authentication methods creates dependency on a specific feature with the methods. Have you considered performing this outside EAP? For example, via EAP lower layers.
Good question. I guess the overall conclusion is that *something* has to be changed in order for the information to be exchanged. Then we can talk about what that something is, and how easy or hard changing it is compared to something else.
The good thing with the EAP approach is that you can keep your lower layer unchanged. The good thing with the EAP lower layer approach is that you can keep your EAP methods unchanged ;-) Which one is better depends on your specific situation.
(In order to use the EAP lower layer for this, you'd also have convert between the AAA and lower layer protocol in the access point, and secure the information through EAP generated keys (EMSK etc) so that the access point can not change them. Alternatively, you could invent some way of signing the lower layer advertisements that already exist, through EAP-generated keys.)
The framework requires extensions to the AAA backend protocols. This is briefly mentioned in the Security Considerations section, but eventually I think it deserves some elaboration.
That's right. The next revision intends to list also the AAA mappings of the parameters.
3.2.1 Service Type Parameter ...
0 PPP 1 IEEE 802.11 2 PANA 3 IKEv2
I think this service type space, as defined in the draft, is not as homogeneous. PPP, PANA, and IKEv2 (EAP lower layers) can be used on IEEE 802.11 (a link-layer type).
To me, there are the following views:
a- access type: remote (VPN-based) vs. local b- EAP lower layer: PPP, IEEE 802.1X, PANA, IKEv2 c- Access technology: IEEE 802.11, DSL, GPRS, IP-in-IP tunnels (VPN), etc.
Maybe we can see the service type from the view of (b).
This is a valid comment as well.
--Jari
- Re: draft on authenticated service identities, (continued)
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Re: draft on authenticated service identities Yoshihiro Ohba, April 2 2004
- Re: draft on authenticated service identities Jari Arkko, April 2 2004
- Re: draft on authenticated service identities Florent Bersani, April 8 2004
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RE: draft on authenticated service identities Alper Yegin, April 12 2004
- Re: draft on authenticated service identities Jari Arkko, April 14 2004
- RE: draft on authenticated service identities Alper Yegin, April 14 2004
- Re: draft on authenticated service identities Jari Arkko, April 14 2004
- RE: draft on authenticated service identities Alper Yegin, April 15 2004
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Re: draft on authenticated service identities Yoshihiro Ohba, April 2 2004
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