eap Mailing List: Pseudo-WG last call on draft-walker-ieee802-req-00.txt

[Tschofenig Hannes (hannes.tschofenig]

Issue TBD: User identity confidentiality
Submitter name: Hannes Tschofenig       
Submitter email address: Hannes.Tschofenig [at] siemens.com
Date first submitted: 10/3/2004
Reference:
http://mail.frascone.com/pipermail/public/eap/2004-March/002361.html
Document: draft-walker-ieee802-req-00 
Comment type: 'T'
Priority: '1' Should fix 
Section: 2.3 and 2.4
Rationale/Explanation of issue:

Section 2.4 lists the requirement for user identity confidentiality as a MAY
requirement:

"
[10] End-user identity hiding.  This corresponds to the
     "Confidentiality" security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section
     7.2.1.
"

User identity confidentiality gains more importance in the presence of wlan
hotspots and also due to transmission of location information. 

Additionally, the requirement does not differentiate between active and
passive user identity confidentiality. Solid active user identity
confidentiality requires public based mechanism and cannot be a MUST or
SHOULD requirement. Passive user identity confidentiality can, however, be
accomplished with authentication and key exchange protocols based symmetric
keys. For the wireless environment passive user identity confidentiality
should be of higher priority.

Requested change:

Add a requirement to section 2.3 (SHOULD requirement section):

Passive user identity confidentiality for the EAP peer:  This corresponds to
the
     "Confidentiality" security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section
     7.2.1. Passive user identity confidentiality provides protection
against an eavesdropper at the wireless link or in the AAA infrastructure.
It does not protect against an active adversary. 
"

Modify existing requirement in section 2.4 (MAY requirement section):

Active user identity confidentiality for the EAP peer:  This corresponds to
the
     "Confidentiality" security claim defined in [RFC2284bis], Section
     7.2.1. Active user identity confidentiality prevents disclosure of the
identity of the EAP peer even against an active adversary. 
"