| RE: Issue 218: TLS example | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Joseph Salowey (jsalowey |
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| Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2004 13:36:12 -0500 (EST) | |
Jari Arkko wrote: > Joseph Salowey wrote: > >>> Method-specific success indications help avoid these >>> issues. In a method suporting success indications, >>> a peer willing to accept access does not consider >>> the authentication successful until receives an >>> indication that the server is willing to >>> grant access. >>> >>> In such a method, a server willing to grant access >>> does not consider the authentication successful >>> until it receives an indication that the >>> peer is willing to accept access. >>> >> >> [Joe] The two previous paragraphs require the authentication method >> to perform full authorization in order to implement method-specific >> success indications. Protected result indications for authentication >> methods should synchronize the result of authentication. >> >> "does not consider the authentication successful until it receives >> and indication that the [peer/server] successfully completed >> authentication." > > I think your version is the absolute minimum that can be/is > provided by these indications. Bernard's version on the other > hand is the absolute maximum that can ever be provided. I > think the truth lies somewhere in between... We are also > walking a fine line between not requiring impossible things > from implementations but still making it possible to use EAP > in a reasonable manner in the peer-to-peer case. > > How about this: "...until it receives an indication that the > peer/server successfully completed authentication. When > sending such indications, the sender SHOULD verify that > sufficient authorization exists for granting access, though > as discussed below this is not always possible." > [Joe] The SHOULD here is really not appropriate. We are talking about an authentication protocol. How about "...until it receives an indication that the peer/server successfully completed authentication. When sending such indications, it is often desirable to verify that sufficient authorization exists for granting access, though as discussed below this is not always possible." >>> Success indications may be explicit or implicit. >>> For example, where a method supports error messages, >>> an implicit success indication may be defined as the reception of a >>> specific message without a preceding error message. Failure >>> indications are typically explicit. >>> >>> As described in Section 4.2.1, a peer silently >>> discards a Failure packet received at a point where >>> the method does not explicitly permit this to be sent. >>> For example, a method providing its own error >>> messages might require the peer to receive an >>> an error message prior to accepting a Failure packet. >>> While this may be useful for debugging purposes, >>> it will typically add a round-trip to the method. >>> >>> Where result indications are authenticated, >>> integrity and replay protected, it is possible to >>> to address spoofing vulnerabilities. Since protected >>> result indications require use of a key for per-packet >>> authentication and integrity protection, methods supporting >>> protected result indications MUST also support the "key >>> derivation", "mutual authentication" "integrity protection" and >>> "replay protection" claims. However, since errors can occur prior >>> to key derivation, it is typically not possible to protect all >>> failure indications. >>> >>> While protected result indications may enable synchronization >>> between the peer and the server, this does not guarantee that the >>> peer and authenticator will be synchronized or that timeouts will >>> not occur. For example, the EAP server may not be aware of an >>> authorization decision made by a AAA proxy; or the EAP server may >>> grant access, but the authenticator may be unable to provide it due >>> to a temporary lack of resources. In these situations, >>> synchronization can only be achieved via lower layer result >>> indications. >>> >> >> [Joe] "Protected protected result indications may enable >> synchronization of the authentication result between the peer and the >> server, this does not guarantee that the that the peer and the >> authenticator will be synchronized to authorize access." > > Yes, better. Thanks. > > --Jari
- Re: Issue 218: TLS example, (continued)
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Re: Issue 218: TLS example Bernard Aboba, February 3 2004
- Re: Issue 218: TLS example Jari Arkko, February 4 2004
- RE: Issue 218: TLS example Joseph Salowey, February 4 2004
- Re: Issue 218: TLS example Jari Arkko, February 4 2004
- RE: Issue 218: TLS example Joseph Salowey, February 4 2004
- Re: Issue 218: TLS example Jari Arkko, February 4 2004
- Re: Issue 218: TLS example Bernard Aboba, February 8 2004
- Re: Issue 218: TLS example Bernard Aboba, February 8 2004
- Re: Issue 218: TLS example Jari Arkko, February 8 2004
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Re: Issue 218: TLS example Bernard Aboba, February 3 2004
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