| Re: [Issue ] Comments on section 3 of keying draft | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: John Vollbrecht (jrv |
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| Date: Thu, 22 Jan 2004 14:02:04 -0500 (EST) | |
--On Wednesday, January 21, 2004 2:11 PM -0800 Joseph Salowey <jsalowey [at] cisco.com> wrote:
Submitter name: Joe Salowey Submitter email address: jsalowey [at] cisco.com Date first submitted: 1/21/2004 Reference: Document: Keying Framework Comment type: 'E'ditorial Priority: '1' Should fix Section: Section 3 Rationale/Explanation of issue:
1. Use of term "security Association":
In section 3 the use of term security association is somewhat non-standard. A security association is typically something that is generated dynamically and valid for a length of time.
[1] The EAP-SA is more of a static relationship such as a trusted root key. [2] The EAP-Method SA is more along the lines of standard SA terminology. It is not visible outside the EAP-method. [3] The EAP-Key SA I do not think is really an SA. There are EAP-Key(s), but they must be managed outside the EAP protocol since EAP provides no key management functionality other than establishment. These EAP-Seeded SAs are managed by some other application separate from EAP. Examples of EAP Seeded SA are in section 3.5 [4] The AAA-SA is similar to [1] above in that there is a trusted root key.
There are also "EAP-Seeded" SAs of which 3.5 is an example
Recommended Changes:
Use a different term than security association for other relationships or don't discuss them in this section.
I'm not sure that so much detail is needed for the EAP-Method SA since it is not visible outside a method.
Create section on EAP-Seeded SAs which describes Unicast SA and other possible SA based on the exchanged EAP keys.
I like the approach described here. I do have a question about whether the SA, which is used by 802.11, should be described in an EAP spec. Perhaps it should because EAP is spelling out requirements for EAP methods. Perhaps it should because there is no place else. My question is though, if no use of EMSK is included, why include use of MSK? Also, is there a reason, if multiple AMSKs can be derived from the EMSK that the MSK could not also be derived from it?
I am not an expert in this area, so this may well be fine.
Perhaps some indication of which Server as well as which method would be appropriate? I am not sure exactly what the key name supports, so this may be inappropriate.DO not use the term EAP SA as it confusing as to what is being discussed.
I'm not sure that multicast security association needs to be discussed as it is usually is derived from a unicast security association and not directly involved with EAP.
2. Key Naming (Section 3.7)
I think the only thing that needs to be named within the scope of EAP is the MSK and the EMSK resulting from a particular EAP exchange. This needs to be defined by the method. Here is some suggested test
"EAP methods are responsible for defining and exporting a key name. The base EAP key name is an octet string between 15 and 31 octets. To name the MSK a M is prepended to the base name and for the EMSK a 'E' is prepended to the base name. The method for generating a base name is specific to the method, but it must be unique to each exchange and cryptographically bound to the exchange. An example for EAP-TLS is to take MD5 hash of the two finished messages in the TLS handshake in the order that they appear. It is NOT RECOMMENDED that a static function of the MSK or EMSK be used as publically known name. Other applications may use the EAP key name to derive names for their purposes that have additional meaning. "
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[Issue ] Comments on section 3 of keying draft Joseph Salowey, January 21 2004
- Re: [Issue ] Comments on section 3 of keying draft John Vollbrecht, January 22 2004
- RE: [Issue ] Comments on section 3 of keying draft Joseph Salowey, January 22 2004
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