| Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis | <– Date –> <– Thread –> |
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From: Jim Burns (jeb |
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| Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2004 18:58:00 -0500 (EST) | |
Hi folks,
Yes, a reread of 6.7 leads me to believe that it could be confusing to implementers. My opinion is that the current 6.7 was written before there was a supplicant controlled port. With the addition of the supplicant controlled port, the uni-directional nature of the transport is no longer a blocking feature to a bi-directional EAP method.
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I believe the points we want to make in 6.7 are the following:
.1X is an asymmetric transport protocol (it has two separate roles). It is asymmetric due to history when only the authenticator had a controlled port.
Now that both the supplicant and authenticator both have a controlled port the asymmetry of the .1X transport does not disallow a mutual authentication EAP method from doing a bi-directional authentication over the .1X transport.
There are some idiosyncracies of the asymmetric nature of the .1X transport, the main one being that two simultaneous authentications can be run if both .1X machines are implemented and both must complete successfully for the controlled port to be unblocked.
There are reasons that you may want to utilize two simultaneous authentications, as described in section 2.4 of 2284 (as well as some of the verbage in 6.7).
It should be made clear that two coupled one-way authentications does not provide the same security as a single mutual authentication.
Each application should define which roles of the .1X state machines each device is to implement as well as the class of EAP methods (mutual authenticating or unidirectional authentication or both) that are required.
One must be careful of certain combinations of the number of machines, and be aware that a device with both .1X machines encountering a device with just the .1X authenticator will result in an asymmetric network connection (controlled port open on one device and closed on the other). I have a table that defines all the cases clearly.
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Known uses are: 802.11 infrastructure: 1 supplicant on client and 1 authenticator on AP using mutual authenticating EAP methods.
802.11 adhoc: Each adhoc station should run both supplicant and authenticator with key generating EAP methods. The key used for group key is from the highest numbered MAC address.
802.1 bridges: Both supplicant and authenticator with special variable that makes controlled port controlled only by authenticator enabled. EAP method type not defined.
The current text of 6.7 along with the above points could be the starting point for a revised 6.7 if that is still possible in the IEEE cycle.
Please critique and add to the above list and I will create a revised 6.7 and issue it for critique. I can present it to the IEEE to see if it will be accepted at this time.
Thanks,
Jim B.
Yes, a reread of 6.7 leads me to believe that it could be confusing to implementers. My opinion is that the current 6.7 was written before there was a supplicant controlled port. With the addition of the supplicant controlled port, the uni-directional nature of the transport is no longer a blocking feature to a bi-directional EAP method.
--------------------
I believe the points we want to make in 6.7 are the following:
.1X is an asymmetric transport protocol (it has two separate roles). It is asymmetric due to history when only the authenticator had a controlled port.
Now that both the supplicant and authenticator both have a controlled port the asymmetry of the .1X transport does not disallow a mutual authentication EAP method from doing a bi-directional authentication over the .1X transport.
There are some idiosyncracies of the asymmetric nature of the .1X transport, the main one being that two simultaneous authentications can be run if both .1X machines are implemented and both must complete successfully for the controlled port to be unblocked.
There are reasons that you may want to utilize two simultaneous authentications, as described in section 2.4 of 2284 (as well as some of the verbage in 6.7).
It should be made clear that two coupled one-way authentications does not provide the same security as a single mutual authentication.
Each application should define which roles of the .1X state machines each device is to implement as well as the class of EAP methods (mutual authenticating or unidirectional authentication or both) that are required.
One must be careful of certain combinations of the number of machines, and be aware that a device with both .1X machines encountering a device with just the .1X authenticator will result in an asymmetric network connection (controlled port open on one device and closed on the other). I have a table that defines all the cases clearly.
--------------------------
Known uses are: 802.11 infrastructure: 1 supplicant on client and 1 authenticator on AP using mutual authenticating EAP methods.
802.11 adhoc: Each adhoc station should run both supplicant and authenticator with key generating EAP methods. The key used for group key is from the highest numbered MAC address.
802.1 bridges: Both supplicant and authenticator with special variable that makes controlled port controlled only by authenticator enabled. EAP method type not defined.
The current text of 6.7 along with the above points could be the starting point for a revised 6.7 if that is still possible in the IEEE cycle.
Please critique and add to the above list and I will create a revised 6.7 and issue it for critique. I can present it to the IEEE to see if it will be accepted at this time.
Thanks,
Jim B.
a. Section 6.7 of 802.1X-REV indicates that EAP authentication
can only be uni-directional. RFC 2284bis Section 2.4 states the
conditions under which bi-directional authentication is achievable.
Since 802.1X-REV now leaves authentication to EAP, it is not possible for
IEEE 802 encapsulation to change the fundamental properties of EAP, so the
two specs cannot disagree on this point.
b. Section 6.7 appears to assume (contrary to recent discussion) that there is no way for the AAA server or higher layer to communicate the peer decision down to the lower layer on the authenticator side. Given the new interface variables and discussion on AAA key implications, I think we've settled this issue. While I'm ok with not changing 802.1X-REV to discuss the new interface variables or AAA implications (this can go in the EAP State Machine document), I do think that the implications for the text of Section 6.7 do need to be addresssed.
To fix these issues, it would probably be best if Section 6.7 referenced RFC 2284bis Section 2.4 and removed the paragraphs that appear to contradict RFC 2284bis. Given that 802.1X-REV is entering sponsor ballot, it is relatively late for these fixes to be put in -- but I fear that if the changes are not made now the pain will be much greater down the line, particularly since 802.1af appears to want to address some of the same peer-to-peer issues.
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-
Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis Bernard Aboba, January 19 2004
-
Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis John Vollbrecht, January 19 2004
- Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis Bernard Aboba, January 19 2004
- Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis Jim Burns, January 19 2004
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Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis Bernard Aboba, January 19 2004
- Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis Jim Burns, January 20 2004
- Strawman for a modified section 6.7 for IEEE 802.1XRev Jim Burns, January 21 2004
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Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis John Vollbrecht, January 19 2004
- Re: Discrepancies between 802.1XREV and RFC 2248bis Jari Arkko, January 21 2004
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