Re: network discovery & selection: problem definition
From: Jari Arkko (jari.arkkopiuha.net)
Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2003 14:43:17 -0600 (CST)
Michael Richardson wrote:

    Jari> Why? Perhaps I'm missing something obvious. But even if I
    Jari> authenticate Gamma to be Gamma in IEEE/EAP/AAA, and Gamma's router
    Jari> in SEND, Gamma can still NAT all my traffic and send it off to
    Jari> Delta.

    Jari> But perhaps you are thinking that the user will see "Gamma" on his
    Jari> screen and cry foul. I'm not very optimistic that most users would
    Jari> do this... Even you and I might have trouble understanding whether
    Jari> "Gamma Global Roaming WLAN" is a legal, another SSID on a
    Jari> virtualized "Delta" AP or a bad guy performing an attack.

Of course. And his bill will say "Gamma".
And if necessary, the customer can dispute it.


  But, the customer now has the tools to prevent this abuse. If they choose
not to, well, fine. That's not our problem.

Ok. I think we agree now.


In terms of what to do about it: Bernard and Henrik have added
some words to the 2284bis document to describe the (general)
issue related to fraudulent claims of authenticators. They have
also added a requirement that method specs should say whether
or not they offer some protection for this. Can you take a look
if you like the text:
http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/eapissues.html#Issue%20200

(Solution space: my gut feeling is that this is bigger than
individual methods or network selection, and needs to be handled
in a general fashion. Without doing an EAPv2 design, the best we
can probably do is to design an extension to popular methods,
with common parameter formats and AAA attribute definitions.)

--Jari


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